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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a network allocation problem motivated
by peer-to-peer cloud storage models. The setting is that of a network
of units (e.g. computers) that collaborate and offer each other space for
the back up of the data of each unit. We formulate the problem as an
optimization problem, we cast it into a game theoretic setting and we
then propose a decentralized allocation algorithm based on the log-linear
learning rule. Our main technical result is to prove the convergence of the
algorithm to the optimal allocation. We also present some simulations
that show the feasibility of our solution and corroborate the theoretical
results.
Keywords. Cooperative cloud storage, Network Allocation Problem, Learning
dynamics, Log-linear learning, Noisy Best Response, Time-reversible chains.
1 Introduction
Recently, cooperative storage cloud models based on peer-to-peer architectures
have been proposed as valid alternatives to traditional centralized cloud stor-
age services. The idea is quite simple: instead of using dedicated servers for
the storage of data, the participants themselves offer space available on their
connected devices to host data from other users. In this way, each participant
has two distinct roles: that of a unit that needs external storage to securely
back up its data, and that of a resource available for the back up of data of
other users. This approach has in principle a number of relevant advantages
with respect to traditional cloud storage models. First, it eliminates the need
for a significant dedicated hardware investment so that the service should be
available at (order of magnitude) lower cost. Second, it overcomes the typical
problems related to the use of a single external provider as security threats,
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including man-in-the-middle attacks, and malware, or fragility with respect to
technical failures.
On the wake of the successful peer-to-peer file sharing model of applications
like BitTorrent and its lookalike, the same philosophy may well be leveraged
on a different but very similar application service like storage. Indeed a slew
of fledgling and somehow successful startups are entering in this market niche.
Among the most noteworthy examples are the platforms Sia http://sia.tech and
Storj https://storj.io (see for some information [18] and [19]).
Clearly, a completely decentralized peer-to-peer model must account for
some challenging technical difficulties that are absent in a centralized cloud
model. Firstly, security and privacy must be carefully implemented by ensuring
end-to-end encryption resistant to attackers, as well suitable coding to insure re-
covering from failure of some units. In addition, the model must account for the
latency, performance, and downtime of average user devices. Albeit the above
technical issues are challenging, they can be addressed with the right tools and
architectures available at current state of the art technology and will not be
considered in this paper.
A core part of such cooperative storage model is the mechanism by which
users are made to interact, collaborate and share their storage commodity with
each other. In the existing platforms as Sia and Storj, this part is worked out at
the level of a central server to which all units are connected. At the best of our
knowledge, the design of such a mechanism in a decentralized fashion has not
been yet theoretically addressed and studied in the literature. Our contribution
goes in this direction.
In this paper we present, accompanied by a rigorous mathematical analysis,
a cooperative fully distributed algorithm through which a network of units (e.g.
computers) can collaborate and offer each other space for the back up of the
data of each unit. In this model, there is no need for central supervision and it
can easily incorporate features that we want the system to possess depending
on the application, as for instance, enforcing structure on the way data of each
unit is treated (aggregate or rather disgregate in the back up process), avoiding
congestion phenomena in the use of the resources, differentiate among resources
on the basis of their reliability. A different version of the algorithm and without
analytical results was presented in [5].
We formulate the problem as an optimal network allocation problem where
a population of units is connected through a graph and each of them possesses
a number of items that need to be allocated among the neighboring units. Each
unit in turn offer a certain amount of storage space where neighboring units can
allocate their items. The optimal allocation is the one maximizing a given func-
tional that depends on the allocation status of each unit and that incorporates
the desired features we want the solution to possess.
In order to solve the optimization problem in a scalable decentralized fashion
we cast the allocation problem into a game theoretic framework and we design
the algorithm using a learning dynamics. The use of game theory to solve dis-
tributed optimization problems and, more in general, in the design and control
of large scale networked engineering systems is becoming increasingly popular
[7, 9, 11, 10]. The basic idea is that of modeling system units as rational agents
whose behavior consists in a selfish search for their maximum utility. The goal
is to design both the agents utility functions and a learning adaptation rule in
such a way that the resulting global behavior is (close to) the desired one, the
maximum in the specific case of optimization problems. Two are the challenges
that typically we need to face. First, design agent utility functions that only
uses information present at the level of the single units and that leads to a
game whose Nash equilibria contain the desired configurations. Second, design
the learning mechanism through which system converges to a desired Nash.
For optimization purposes, an interesting strategy [10, 13] is to design utility
functions so to yield a potential game whose potential coincide with the reward
functional of the problem and then consider the log-linear learning dynamics
(also known as noisy best response) [2, 11, 12]. Under certain assumptions, this
rule is known to lead to a time-reversible ergodic Markov chain whose invariant
probability distribution is a Gibbs measure with energy function described by
the potential and (for small noise parameter) has its peak on the maxima of the
potential. In this paper we follow this road.
For a very general family of functionals having an additive separable form,
namely that can be expressed as sums of terms depending on the various units,
we define a game by setting the utility function of each unit as simply the sum
of those addends in the functional involving the unit itself and its neighbors,
while the action set of a unit consists of the vectors describing the allocation
among its various neighbors. The game so defined is easily shown to be potential
with potential given by the original functional. The game, however, possesses
a key critical feature: because of the hard storage constraints of the various
resources, units are not free to choose their actions as they want, but they
are constrained from the choice made by other units. For instance, if a unit is
saturating the space available in a certain resource, other units connected to the
same resource will not be able to use it. In cooperative cloud storage models
where resources are common users, this hard storage constraint is a very natural
assumption and can not be relaxed. This property is non-classical in game
theory and has remarkable consequences on the structure of Nash equilibria and
the behavior of the best response dynamics that is not guaranteed in general
to approximate the optimum. Indeed, constrained equilibrium problems and
convergence algorithm are widely studied in literature and they are known as
Generalized Nash Equilibrium Problems ([3, 4] and reference therein).
The main technical contribution of this paper is to show that, despite these
hard constraints, under mild technical conditions, a family of dynamics having
their core on the log-linear learning rule converge to the desired solution. More
precisely, by a careful analysis of the connectivity properties of the transition
graph associated to the Markov process, we will obtain two results: (i) if there
is enough space for allocation to take place, under the proposed algorithms, all
units will complete their allocation in finite time with probability one; and (ii),
under a slight stronger assumption, the allocation configuration converges, when
the noise parameter approaches 0, to a maximum of the original functional. At
the best of our knowledge, this analysis is new in game theory.
We want to remark that, the type of functionals considered are typically non-
convex (even when relaxed to continuous variables) so that many algorithms
for distributed optimization may fail to converge to the global maximum. In
addition, the proposed algorithm presents a number of interesting features. The
algorithm is decentralized and adapted to any predefined graph. For the cloud
application we have in mind, the choice of the graph topology can be seen
as a design parameter that allows to control the computational complexity at
the units level. It is asyncronous and it is robust with respect to temporary
disconnection of units. Moreover, it is intrinsically open-ended: if new data or
new units enters into the system, a new run of the algorithm will automatically
permit the allocation of the new data and, possibly, the redistribution of the
data stored by the old units to take advantage of new available space.
The remaining part of this section is dedicated to some literature review.
In Section 2 we formally define the network allocation problem and recall some
basic facts proven in [5] (in particular, a necessary and sufficient condition for
the allocation problem to be solvable). We then introduce a family of func-
tionals and define the optimal allocation problem. Section 3 is devoted to cast
the problem to a potential game theoretic framework [16, 14] and to propose
a distributed algorithm that is an instance of a noisy best response dynamics.
The main technical part of the paper is Section 4 where the fundamental re-
sults Theorem 6 and Corollary 12 are stated and proven. Theorem 6 ensures
that the algorithm reaches a complete allocation with probability one, if a com-
plete allocation is indeed possible. Corollary 12 studies the asymptotic behavior
of the algorithm and explicitly exhibits the invariant probability distribution.
Consequence of Corollary 12 is that in the double limit when time goes to in-
finity and the noise parameter goes to 0, the algorithm converges to a Nash
equilibrium that is, in particular, a global maximum of the potential function.
This guarantees that the solution will indeed be close to the global welfare of
the community. Finally, Section 5 is devoted to the presentation of a set of
simulations that show a practical implementation of the algorithm. Though we
work out relatively simple examples, our simulations show the good properties
of the algorithm, its scalability properties in terms of speed and complexity,
and illustrate the effect of the parameters of the utility functions in the solution
reached by the algorithm. A conclusion section ends the paper.
1.1 Related Work
Our problem fits into the wide class of distributed resource allocation problems.
Among the many applications where such problems arise in a similar form to
the one proposed in this paper, we can cite cloud computing [8], network routing
[17], vehicle target assignment [1], content distribution [6], graph coloring [15].
The game theoretic approach to allocation problems and the consequent design
of distributed algorithms has been systematically addressed in [13, 10, 11, 12]
where general techniques for the choice of the utility functions and of the dy-
namic learning rule have been proposed.
The model proposed in this paper and the algorithm based on noisy best
response dynamics, is inspired by this literature. A key aspect of our model and
that makes it different from the models treated in the above literature is the
fact that resources have hard storage limitations. This is a natural feature of
the distributed cloud storage problem considered in this paper and that, to our
knowledge, had not yet been previously analyzed.
2 The cooperative storage model
Consider a set X of units that play the double role of users who have to allocate
externally a back up of their data, as well resources where data from other units
can be allocated. Generically, an element of X will be called a unit, while the
terms user and resource will be used when the unit is considered in the two
possible roles of, respectively, a source or a recipient of data. We assume units
to be connected through a directed graph G = (X , E) where a link (x, y) ∈ E
means that unit x is allowed to store data in unit y. We denote by
Nx := {y ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ E}, N
−
y := {x ∈ X | (x, y) ∈ E}
respectively, the out- and the in-neighborhood of a node. Note the important
different interpretation in our context: Nx represents the set of resources avail-
able to unit x while N−y is the set of units having access to resource y. If D ⊆ X ,
we put N(D) = ∪x∈DNx and N
−(D) = ∪x∈DN
−
x .
We imagine the data possessed by the units to be quantized atoms of the
same size. Each unit x is characterized by two non negative integers:
• αx is the number of data atoms that unit x needs to back up into his
neighbors,
• βx is the number of data atoms that unit x can accept and store from his
neighbors.
The numbers {αx} and {βx} will be assembled into two vectors denoted, respec-
tively, α and β. Given the triple (G, α, β), we define a partial state allocation as
any matrix W ∈ NX×X that satisfies the following conditions
(P1) Wxy ≥ 0 for all x, y and Wxy = 0 if (x, y) 6∈ E .
(P2) W x :=
∑
y∈X
Wxy ≤ αx for all x ∈ X .
(P3) Wy :=
∑
x∈X
Wxy ≤ βy for all y ∈ X .
We interpret Wxy as the number of pieces of data that x has allocated in y
under W . Property (P1) enforces the graph constraint: x can allocate in y iff
(x, y) ∈ E . Property (P2) says that a unit can not allocate more data than the
one it owns, and, finally, (P3) describes the storage constraint at the level of
units considered as resources. Whenever W satisfies (P2) with equality for all
x ∈ X , we say that W is an allocation state. The set of partial allocation states
and the set of allocation states are denoted, respectively, with the symbols Wp
and W . We will say that the allocation problem is solvable if a state allocation
W ∈ W exists.
2.1 Existence of allocations
The following result gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence
of allocations. The proof, which follows from Hall’s theorem, can be found in
[5].
Theorem 1. Given (G, α, β), there exists a state allocation iff the following
condition is satisfied: ∑
x∈D
αx ≤
∑
y∈N(D)
βy ∀D ⊆ X (1)
We first analyze the existence of allocations in the simple case of a complete
network.
Example 1. If G is complete, we have that N({x}) = X \{x} while N(D) = X
for all D such that |D| ≥ 2. Therefore, in this case, condition (1) reduces to
αx ≤
∑
y 6=x
βy, ∀x ∈ X
∑
x∈X
αx ≤
∑
y∈X
βy (2)
We now focus on the special but intersting case when all units have the same
amount of data to be stored and the same space available, namely, αx = a,
βx = b for every x ∈ X . In this case, condition (2) that characterizes the
existence of allocations for the complete graph, simply reduces to a ≤ b. In this
case, among the possible allocation states there are those where each unit uses
only one resource: given any permutation σ : X → X without fixed points, we
can consider
W σxy =
{
a if σ(x) = y
0 otherwise
(3)
In general, an allocation state as W σ in (3) of the example above where each
unit uses just one resource and each resource is only used by one unit, is called a
matching allocation state. Existence of matching allocation states is guaranteed
for more general graphs than the complete ones.
Proposition 2. Let G = (X , E) be any graph and assume that αx = a, βx = b
for every x ∈ X . The following conditions are equivalent:
(i) There exists an allocation state W ;
(ii) There exists a matching allocation state;
(iii) a ≤ b and |D| ≤ |N(D)| for every subset D ⊆ X .
Proof (ii) ⇒ (i) is trivial. Notice that (iii) is, in this case, equivalent to
condition (1). Therefore (i) ⇒ (iii) follows from Theorem 1. What remains to
be shown is that (iii) ⇒ (ii). To this aim, notice that when (iii) is verified and
we consider the bipartite graph G˜ = (X × X , E˜) where (x, y) ∈ E˜ iff (x, y) ∈ E,
Hall’s theorem guarantees the existence of a matching in G˜ complete on the
first set, namely a permutation σ : X → X such that (x, σ(x)) ∈ E˜ for every
x ∈ X . The corresponding state allocationW σ defined as in in (3) is a matching
allocation state.
We can now extend the result contained in Example 1.
Corollary 3. Suppose that G = (X , E) is any undirected regular graph and that
αx = a, βx = b for every x ∈ X with a ≤ b. Then, there exists a (matching)
allocation state.
Proof Let s be the degree of each node in the graph. Fix any subset D ⊆ X .
If ED is the set of directed edges starting from a node in D, we have that
s|D| = |ED| ≥ s|N(D)|. This implies that that |D| ≤ |N(D)|. We conclude
using Proposition 2.
Not necessarily a matching allocation state is the desirable one. In certain
applications, security issues may rather require to fragment the data of each
unit as much as possible. Suppose we are under the same assumptions than in
previous result, namely G = (X , E) is an undirected regular graph with degree
s, αx = a, βx = b for every x ∈ X with a ≤ b. If moreover s divides a we can
also consider the ’diffused’ allocation state given by
Wxy =
a
s
Axy (4)
where A is the adjacency matrix of G. Notice that all these matrices W can
also be interpreted as valid allocation states for the case when the underlying
graph is complete.
For graphs that are not regular, simple characterizations of the existence
of allocations in general do not exist. However, sufficient conditions can be
obtained as the result below shows and whose proof follows along the same line
than the proof of Corollary 3.
Proposition 4. Let G be any graph with minimal out-degree dmin and max-
imum in-degree d−max. Let a = maxx αx, b = minx βx and assume that a ≤
bdmin/d
−
max. Then, there exists an allocation state.
The above result can not be improved: indeed in a star graph with αx = a,
βx = b for every x ∈ X , it is immediate to see that the condition a ≤ bdmin/d
−
max
is necessary for an allocation to exist.
2.2 The optimal allocation problem
On the set of allocation states, we define a reward functional measuring qualita-
tive and realistic features that we desire the solution to possess, i.e., congestion
and aggragation. Functionals considered in this paper have a separable structure
that is a standard assumption in allocation problems [13].
We start with a notation. Given a (partial) allocation state W ∈ Wp, we
denote with the symbols (Wx·) and (W·y), respectively, the row vector of W
with label x, and the column vector of W with label y. We consider functionals
Ψ :Wp → R of the type:
Ψ(W ) =
∑
x∈X
fx(Wx·) +
∑
y∈X
gy(W·y) (5)
consisting of two parts: one that takes into account the way each unit is suc-
ceeding in allocating its data and another that is typical a congestion term and
considers the amount of data present in the various resources. Our goal is to
maximize the functional Ψ over the set of allocation states W . The reason for
defining Ψ in the larger set of partial allocation states Wp will be clearer later
when we present the game theoretic set up and the algorithm.
Examples and simulations in this paper will focus on the following cases:
fx(Wx·) = C
all
∑
yWxy + C
agg
∑
y∈X W
2
xy,
gy(Wy) = −C
con
y (Wy)
2
(6)
We now explain the meaning of the various terms:
• the term Call
∑
x
∑
yWxy where C
all > 0 is sufficiently large, has the
effect of pushing the optimum to be an allocation state (a configuration
where all units have stored their entire set of data);
• the term Cagg
∑
x
∑
y∈X W
2
xy has different significance depending on the
sign of Cagg. If Cagg > 0 plays the role of an aggregation term, it pushes
units not to use many different resources for their allocation. If instead
Cagg < 0, the term has the opposite effect as it pushes towards fragmen-
tation of the data.
• the term −
∑
y C
con
y (Wy)
2 is a classical congestion term: the constants
−Ccony < 0 for all y measure the reliability of the various resources and
pushes the use of more reliable resources
An alternative choice for the resource congestion term is the following. Put
|W·y|H = |{x ∈ X , Wxy > 0}| the number of units that are using resource y and
consider
gy(W·y) = −C
con
y |W·y |H (7)
This might be useful in contexts where it is necessary the control the number
of units accessing the same resource, to avoid communication burden.
The functionals (6) and (7) reflects the features that we wanted to enforce:
congestion and aggregation. The reason for the latter feature comes from the
fact that an exceeding fragmentation of the stored data will cause a blow up
in the number of communications among the units, both in the storage and
recovery phases. This feature should be considered against another feature, the
diversification of back ups, which in this paper is not going to be addressed. In
real applications, units will need to store multiple copies of their data in order
to cope with security and failure phenomena. In that case, these multiple copies
will need to be stored in different units. On the other hand, the congestion term
is represented by a classical cost function that each user possibly experiences,
for instance, as a delay in the storage/recovery actions.
The above desired features may be contradictory in general and we want
to have tunable parameters to make the algorithm converge towards a desired
compromised solution. The choice of this functionals has been made on the basis
of simple realistic considerations and on the fact that, as exploited below, this
leads to a potential game. In principle, different terms in the utility function can
be introduced in order to make units to take into considerations other desired
features (e.g multiple back up).
While our theory and algorithms will be formulated for a generic Ψ as defined
in (5), the example proposed and the numerical simulations will be restricted
to the specific cases we have described.
Below we present a couple of examples of explicit computation of the maxima
of Ψ. We assume Ψ to be of the form described in (5) and (6) with Ccony = C
con
for every y ∈ X . We also assume that αx = a, βx = b for every x ∈ X with
a ≤ b.
Example 2. Suppose that G = (X , E) is any undirected regular graph and
assume that αx = a, βx = b for every x ∈ X with a ≤ b. Take Ψ to be of
the form described in (5) and (6) with Ccony = C
con > 0 for every y ∈ X . There
are two cases:
• Cagg > 0. In this case, the maxima of Ψ coincide with the matching allo-
cation states. Indeed notice that any matching allocation state W (whose
existence is guaranteed by Proposition 2) separately maximizes, for each
y, the two expressions
∑
y∈X Wxy and
∑
y∈X W
2
xy. Moreover, considering
that Wy = a for every resource y, simultaneously, minimize the congestion
expression
∑
y∈X (Wy)
2. The fact that these are the only possible maxima
is evident from these considerations.
• Cagg < 0. If the degree s of G divides a, arguing like above, we see that the
unique maximum is given by the diffused allocation state (4). When s does
not divide a, such a simple solution does not exist. In this case, maxima
can be characterized as follows. Put a = sk + r = (s − r)k + r(k + 1)
(with r < s) and consider a regular subgraph G˜ of degree r. An optimal
allocation is obtained by letting units allocate k + 1 atoms of their data
in each of their neighbors in G˜ and k atoms of their data in each of the
remaining neighbors.
3 The game theoretic set-up and the algorithm
In this paper we recast the optimization problem into a game theoretic context
and we then use learning dynamics to derive decentralized algorithms adapted
to the given graph topology that solve the allocation problem and maximize the
functional Ψ.
Assume that a functional Ψ as in (5) has been fixed. We associate a game
to Ψ according to the ideas developed in [1, 13] where there can be found other
possible utility and potential functions.
The set of actions Ax of a unit x is given by all possible row vectors (Wx·)
such that
∑
xWxy ≤ αx. In this way the product set of actions
∏
xAx can be
made to coincide with the space of non-negative matricesW ∈ RX×X such that∑
xWxy ≤ αx for every x ∈ X . Such a W in general is not a partial allocation.
Indeed, such a W will automatically only possess properties (P1) and (P2). We
have that W ∈ Wp if the extra conditions (P3),
∑
yWxy ≤ βy for every y ∈ X ,
is satisfied. This is a key non classical feature of the game associated to our
model: the storage limitations make the available actions of a unit depend on
the choice made be the other ones.
Now, for each unit x, we define its utility function Ux :Wp → R as
Ux(W ) = fx(Wx·) +
∑
y∈N−x
gy(W·y) . (8)
Note that, in order to compute Ux(W ), unit x needs to know, besides the state
of its own data allocation {Wx·}, the congestion state gy(W·y) of the neighboring
resources.
We now recall some basic facts of game theory. A Nash equilibrium is any
allocation state W ∈ Wp such that, for every agent x¯ ∈ X , and for every
W ′ ∈ Wp such that Wxy =W
′
xy for every x 6= x¯ and for every y, it holds
Ux¯(W ) ≥ Ux¯(W
′) (9)
If W,W ′ ∈ Wp are two allocation states such that Wxy = W
′
xy for every x 6= x¯
and for every y, it is straightforward to see that the following equality holds
Ux(W
′)− Ux(W ) = Ψ(W
′)−Ψ(W ) (10)
This says, in the language of game theory [14], that the game is potential with
potential function given by Ψ itself. A simple classical result says that maxima
of the potential are Nash equilibria for the game. In general the game will
possess extra Nash equilibria.
The choice (8) is not the only one to lead to a potential game with potential
Ψ. Other possibilities can be constructed following [1, 13]. As far as our theory
is concerned, the specific form of the utility functions is not important as far
as it leads to a potential game with potential Ψ. On the utility functions, (8)
or its possible alternatives, we impose a monotonicity condition that essentially
says that no unit will ever have a vantage to remove data already allocated.
Precisely, we assume that for every W,W ′ ∈ Wp, x¯ ∈ X such that Wxy = W
′
xy
for every x 6= x¯ and for every y, the following holds
W ′x¯ < W x¯ ⇒ Ux¯(W
′) < Ux¯(W ) (11)
This condition is not strictly necessary for our results (as our algorithm actually
will not allow units to remove data), it is however a meaningful assumption and
simulations show that helps to speed up the algorithm.
We now focus on the case when Ψ is of the form given by (6) with Ccony =
Ccon for every y ∈ X . In this case, a simple check shows that the monotonicity
condition (11) is guaranteed if we impose the condition
Call > 2(||α||∞|C
agg|+ ||β||∞C
con) (12)
where ||v||∞ = max vi is the infinity norm of a vector.
We conclude this section, computing the Nash equilibria in a couple of simple
examples and discussing the relation with the maxima of Ψ.
Example 3. Suppose that G is the complete graph with three units and that
αx = a = 2 and βx = b ≥ 2 for x = 1, 2, 3. Consider Ψ to be of the form (6)
with Ccony = C
con for every y ∈ X and that condition (12) holds. Consider the
following allocation states
W 1 =

0 2 00 0 2
2 0 0

 ,W 2 =

0 0 22 0 0
0 2 0

 ,W 3 =

0 1 11 0 1
1 1 0


We know from the considerations in Example 2 that in the case when Cagg > 0,
the matching allocation states W 1 and W 2 are the (only) two maxima of Ψ and
thus Nash equilibria. Instead, if Cagg < 0, the diffused allocation state W 3 is
the only maximum of Ψ and is in this case a Nash equilibrium.
Notice now that if b < 3, the only three possible allocation states are W i for
i = 1, 2, 3. Since any two of these matrices differ in more than one row and
condition (12) yields (11), we deduce that all three of them are in this case Nash
equilibria, independently on the sign of Cagg.
Suppose now that b ≥ 3. Explicit simple computations show that, if Cagg ≤
Ccon, W 3 is a Nash equilibrium and if Cagg ≥ −6Ccon, W 1 and W 2 are Nash
equilibria. In summary, if b < 3 or if b ≥ 3 and −6Ccon ≤ Cagg ≤ Ccon, the
three matrices W i for i = 1, 2, 3 are Nash equilibria.
The next example shows that also partial allocations may be Nash equilibria.
Example 4. G 5-cycle, αx = a = 4 and β1 = 7, β2 = 2, β3 = 4, and β4 = β5 =
6. It can be checked that the two matrices below are both Nash equilibria:
W =


0 0 0 0 4
3 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 4 0
0 0 3 0 1
4 0 0 0 0

 , W =


0 0 0 0 4
3 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4 0
0 0 4 0 0
4 0 0 0 0


The one of the right is a maximum of Ψ, the one on the left is instead a partial
allocation.
3.1 The algorithm
The allocation algorithm we are proposing is fully distributed and asynchronous
and is only based on communications between units, taking place along the links
of the graph G = (X , E). It is based on the ideas of learning dynamics where,
randomly, units activate and modify their action (allocation state) in order to
increase their utility. The most popular of these dynamics is the so-called best
response where units at every step choose the action maximizing their utility.
This dynamics is proven to converge almost surely, in finite time, to a Nash
equilibrium. In presence of Nash equilibria that are not maxima of the potential
(as it is in our case) best response dynamics is not guaranteed to converge to a
maximum. This is simply because Nash Equilibria are always equilibrium points
for the dynamics. A popular variation of the best response is the so-called noisy
best response (also known as log-linear learning) where maximization of utility
is relaxed to a random choice dictated by a Gibbs probability distribution.
We now illustrate the details of our algorithm. For the sake of proposing
a realistic model we immagine that units may temporarily be shut down or
in any case disconnected from the network. We model this assuming that,
at every instant of time, a unit is either in functional state on or off: units
in functional state off are not available for communication and for any action
including storage and data retrieval. A unit, which is currently in state on,
can activate and either newly allocate or move some data among the available
resources (e.g. those neighbors that still have place available and that are on
at that time). The functional state of the network at a certain time will be
denoted by ξ ∈ {0, 1}X : ξx = 1 means that the unit x is on. The times when
units modify their functional state (off to on or on to off) and the times when
units in functional state on activate are modeled as a family of independent
Poisson clocks whose rates will be denoted (for unit x), respectively, νonx , ν
off
x ,
and νactx . The functional state of the network as a function of time ξ(t) is thus a
continuous time Markov process whose components are independent Bernoulli
processes.
We now describe the core of the algorithm, namely the rules under which
activated units can modify their allocation state.
We start with some notation. Given a (possibly partial) allocation state
W ∈ Wp, a functional state ξ ∈ {0, 1}
X , and a unit x¯ ∈ X such that ξx¯ = 1,
define:
Wx¯(W, ξ) =
{
W ′ ∈ Wp :
W ′xy =Wxy if x 6= x¯ or ξy = 0
W ′x¯ ≥W x¯, W ′ 6=W
}
.
Wx¯(W, ξ) describes the possible partial allocation states obtainable from W
by modifications done by the unit x¯: only the terms Wx¯y where y is on can be
modified and the total amount of allocated dataW x¯ can only increase or remain
equal. Since the sets Wx¯(W, ξ) can in general be very large, it is convenient to
consider the possibility that the algorithm might use a smaller set of actions
where units either allocate new data or simply move data from one resource to
another one.
Given (W, ξ) ∈ Wp × {0, 1}
X and a unit x¯, define
Nx¯(W, ξ) := {y ∈ Nx¯ |Wx¯y < βy, ξy = 1} (13)
the set of available neighbor resources for x¯ under the allocation state W and
the functional state ξ: those that are on and still have space available.
A family of sets Mx¯(W, ξ) ⊆ Wx¯(W, ξ), defined for each x¯ ∈ X and each
(W, ξ) ∈ Wp × {0, 1}
X , is called admissible if
(i) W x¯ < αx¯, y ∈ Nx¯(W, ξ),⇒ ∃n :W
′ =W + nex¯y ∈ Mx¯(W, ξ);
(ii) Wx¯y′ > 0, ξy′ = 1, y
′′ ∈ Nx¯(W, ξ)⇒W
′ =W +(ex¯y′′ −ex¯y′) ∈ Mx¯(W, ξ);
(iii) W ′ ∈Mx¯(W, ξ) iff W ∈Mx¯(W
′, ξ) for every W ∈ W .
Conditions (i) and (ii) essentially asserts that when a unit has an available
neighbor resource not yet saturated, then Mx¯(W, ξ) must incorporate the pos-
sibility to newly allocate or transfer already allocated data into it. Condition
(iii) instead simply says that when the functional state does not change and we
are in an allocation state, any transformation can be reversed.
Examples of admissible families Mx¯(W, ξ) are the following
1. Mx¯(W, ξ) =Wx¯(W, ξ)
2. Mx¯(W, ξ) = {W
′ ∈ Wx¯(W, ξ) : ∃y, ∃n W
′ = W + nex¯y)} ∪ {W
′ ∈
Wx¯(W, ξ) : ∃y
′, y′′, ∃n W ′ =W + n(ex¯y′′ − ex¯y′)}
3. Mx¯(W, ξ) = {W
′ ∈ Wx¯(W, ξ) : ∃y, ∃n ∈ Q W
′ = W + nex¯y)} ∪ {W
′ ∈
Wx¯(W, ξ) : ∃y
′, y′′, ∃n ∈ Q W ′ = W + n(ex¯y′′ − ex¯y′)} where Q ⊆ N and
1 ∈ Q.
In the second case, modifications allowed are those where a unit either allocate
a certain amount of new data into a single resource or it moves data from one
resource to another one. The third case puts an extra constraint on the amount
of data allocated or moved: the simplest case is Q = {1}, just an atomic piece
of data is newly allocated or moved. Simulation presented in this paper all fit
in this third case with various possible sets Q.
Given an admissible family Mx¯(W, ξ), we now define a Gibbs measure on it
as follows. Given a parameter γ > 0, put
Z
(W,ξ)
x¯ (γ) =
∑
W˜∈Mx¯(W,ξ)
eγUx¯(W˜ )
Z
(W,W ′,ξ)
x¯ (γ) = max
{
Z
(W,ξ)
x¯ (γ), Z
(W ′,ξ)
x¯ (γ)
}
Now define, for W ′ ∈ Mx¯(W, ξ),
P
(W,ξ)
x¯ (W
′) =


eγUx¯(W
′)
Z
(W,ξ)
x¯ (γ)
, if ||W || < ||W ′||
eγUx¯(W
′)
Z
(W,W ′,ξ)
x¯ (γ)
, if ||W || = ||W ′||
(14)
where ||W || =
∑
xyWxy, and complete it to a probability by putting
P
(W,ξ)
x¯ (W ) = 1−
∑
W ′∈Mx¯(W,ξ)
P
(W,ξ)
x¯ (W
′)
The algorithm is completely determined by the choice of the admissible
family Mx¯(W, ξ) and of the probabilities (14). If unit x¯ activates at time t,
the systems is in partial allocation state W (t), and in functional state ξ(t), it
will jump to the new partial allocation state W ′ with probabilities given by
P (W (t+) =W ′) = P
(W (t),ξ(t))
x¯ (W
′), W ′ ∈ Mx¯(W (t), ξ(t)) (15)
If unit x¯ chooses aW ′ such that ||W ′|| > ||W || we say that it makes an allocation
move, otherwise, if ||W ′|| = ||W ||, we talk of a distribution move.
4 Analysis of the algorithm
In this section we analyze the behavior of the algorithm introduced above. We
will essentially show two results:
1. first, we prove that if the set of state allocation W is not empty (i.e.
condition (1) is satisfied), the algorithm above will reach such an allocation
in bounded time with probability 1 (e.gW (t) ∈ W for t sufficiently large);
2. second, we show that, under a slightly stronger assumption than (1), in
the double limit t → +∞ and then γ → +∞, the process W (t) induced
by the algorithm will always converge, in law, to a Nash equilibrium that
is a global maximum of the potential function Ψ.
In order to prove such results, it will be necessary to go through a number
of intermediate technical steps.
In the sequel we assume we have fixed a triple (G, α, β) satisfying the ex-
istence condition (1), an admissible family of sets Mx¯(W, ξ) and we consider
the allocation processW (t) described by (15) with any possible initial condition
W (0).
By the way it has been defined, the process W (t) is Markovian conditioned
to the functional state process ξ(t). If we consider the augmented process
(W (t), ξ(t)), this is Markovian and its only non zero transition rates are de-
scribed below:
Λ(W,ξ),(W,ξ′) =
{
νonx¯ if ξx¯ = 0, ξ
′
x¯ = 1, ξx = ξ
′
x ∀x 6= x¯
νoffx¯ if ξx¯ = 1, ξ
′
x¯ = 0, ξx = ξ
′
x ∀x 6= x¯
Λ(W,ξ),(W ′,ξ) = ν
act
x¯ P
(W,ξ)
x¯ (W
′) if ξx¯ = 1, W
′ ∈ Nx¯(W, ξ)
(16)
We now introduce a graph on Wp that will be denoted by Lp: an edge
(W,W ′) is present in Lp if and only if W
′ ∈Mx¯(W,1). Notice that, if ν
act
x¯ > 0
for every x¯, this can be equivalently described as Λ(W,1),(W ′,1) > 0. The graph
Lp thus describes the possible jumps of the processW (t) conditioned to the fact
that all resources are in functional state on. We want to stress the fact that the
graph Lp depends on the triple (G, α, β) as well on the choice of the admissible
family Mx¯(W,1) but not on the particular choice of the functional Ψ or of the
utility functions Ux¯.
Our strategy, in order to prove our first claim, will be to show that from any
element W ∈ Wp there is a path in Lp to some element W
′ ∈ W .
Given W ∈ Wp we define the following subsets of units
X f (W ) := {x ∈ X |W x = αx},
X sat(W ) := {x ∈ X \ X f (W ) | 6 ∃y ∈ Nx s.t Wy < βy}
Units in X f (W ) are called fully allocated : these units have completed the allo-
cation of their data under the state W . Units in X sat(W ) are called saturated :
they have not yet completed their allocation, however, under the current state
W , they can not make any action, neither allocate, nor distribute. Finally,
define
Wsatp := {W ∈ Wp \W | X = X
f (W ) ∪ X sat(W )}
It is clear that from anyW ∈ Wp \W
sat
p , there exists units that can make either
an allocation or a distribution move. Instead, if we are in a state W ∈ Wsatp ,
there are units that are not fully allocated and all these units con not make any
move. The only units that can possibly make a move are the fully allocated ones.
Notice that, because of condition (1), for sure there exist resources y such that
Wy < βy and these resources are indeed exclusively connected to fully allocated
units. The key point is to show that in a finite number of distribution moves,
performed by fully allocated units, it is always possible to move some data atoms
from resources connected to saturated units to resources with available space:
this will then make possible a further allocation move.
For any fixed W ∈ Wp, we can consider the following graph structure on X
thought as set of resources: HW = (X , EW ). Given y1, y2 ∈ X , there is an edge
from y1 to y2 if and only if there exists x ∈ X for which
Wxy1 > 0, (x, y2) ∈ E
The edge from y1 to y2 will be indicated with the symbol y1 →x y2 (to also recall
the unit x involved). The presence of the edge means that the two resources y1
and y2 are in the neighborhood of a common unit x that is using y1 under W .
This indicates that x can in principle move some of its data currently stored in
y1 into resource y2 if this last one is available. We have the following technical
result
Lemma 5. Suppose (G, α, β) satisfies (1). Fix W ∈ Wp and let y¯ ∈ X be such
that there exists x¯ ∈ Ny¯ with W
x¯ < αx¯. Then, there exists a sequence
y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt (17)
satisfying the following conditions
(Sa) Both families of the yk’s and of the xk’s are each made of distinct elements;
(Sb) yk →xk yk+1 for every k = 0, . . . , t− 1;
(Sc) Wyk = βyk for every k = 0, . . . , t− 1, and Wyt < βyt .
Proof Let Y ⊆ X be the subset of nodes that can be reached from y¯ in HW .
Preliminarily, we prove that there exists y′ ∈ Y such that Wy′ < βy′ . Let
Z := {x ∈ X | ∃y ∈ Y, Wxy > 0}
and notice that, by the way Y and Z have been defined,
x ∈ Z, (x, y) ∈ E ⇒ y ∈ Y (18)
Suppose now that, contrarily to the thesis, Wy ≥ βy for all y ∈ Y. Then,∑
x∈Z
αx ≤
∑
y∈Y
βy
=
∑
y∈Y
Wy
=
∑
y∈Y
∑
x∈Z
Wxy
=
∑
x∈Z
W x
<
∑
x∈Z
αx
(19)
where the first inequality follows from (18) and (1), the first equality from the
contradiction hypothesis, the second equality from the definition of Z, the third
equality again from (18) and, finally, last inequality from the existence of x¯.
This is absurd and thus proves our claim.
Consider now a path of minimal length from y¯ to Y in HW :
y¯ = y0 →x0 y1 →x1 · · · →xt−2 yt−1 →xt−1 yt
and notice that the sequence y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt will automatically
satisfy properties (Sa) to (Sc).
We are now ready to prove the first main result.
Theorem 6. Assume that the following conditions hold
1. (G, α, β) satisfies (1).
2. Mx¯(W, ξ) is an admissible family.
Then, for every W ∈ Wp there is a path in Lp to some element W
′ ∈ W.
Proof We will prove the claim by a double induction process. To this aim we
consider two indices associated to any W ∈ Wp \W . The first one is defined by
mW =
∑
x∈X
(αx −W
x) ≥ 1
To define the second, consider any x¯ ∈ X \ X f (W ). We can apply Lemma
5 to W and any y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and obtain that we can find a sequence of agents
y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the properties (Sa), (Sb), and (Sc)
above. Among all the possible choices of x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯ and of the correspond-
ing sequence, assume we have chosen the one minimizing t and denote such
minimal t by tW . The induction process will be performed with respect to the
lexicographic order induced by the pair (mW , tW ).
In the case when tW = 0, it means we can find x¯ ∈ X and y¯ ∈ Nx¯ such that
Wy¯ < βy¯. This yields y¯ ∈ Nx¯(W,1). Hence, by property (i) in the definition of
an admissible family, it follows that there exists n such that W ′ =W + nex¯y¯ ∈
Mx¯(W,1). Notice thatmW ′ < mW . In casemW = 1, this means thatW
′ ∈ W .
Consider now any W ∈ Wp \W such that t = tW > 1. Let x¯ ∈ X , y¯ ∈ Nx¯
and the sequence y¯ = y0, x0, y1, . . . , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the properties
(Sa), (Sb), and (Sc) above. Since Wxt−1yt−1 > 0 and yt ∈ Nxt−1(W,1), it
follows from property (ii) in the definition of admissible families thatW ′ =W −
(ext−1yt−1 − ext−1yt) ∈ Mxt−1(W,1). Since W
′
yt−1 < βyt−1 , for sure tW ′ < tW .
The induction argument is thus complete.
Corollary 7. Consider the process W (t) as defined in (15) and assume that
the following conditions hold
1. (G, α, β) satisfies (1).
2. νonx > 0 and ν
act
x > 0 for every x ∈ X ,
3. Mx¯(W, ξ) is an admissible family.
Then,
P(∃t0 |W (t) ∈ W ∀t ≥ t0) = 1
Proof It follows from the form of the transition rates (16) and assumption
2), that the process (W (t), ξ(t)), starting from any initial condition (W, ξ), will
reach (W,1) in bounded time with positive probability. Combining with The-
orem 6 and using again 2), it then follows that (W (t), ξ(t)) reaches a couple
(W ′,1) for some W ′ ∈ W in bounded time with positive probability. Since, by
definition of an admissible family, the set {(W ′, ξ), W ′ ∈ W} is invariant by the
process (W (t), ξ(t)), standard results on Markov processes yield the thesis.
We are now left with studying the process W (t) on W . Noisy best response
dynamics are known to yield reversible Markov processes. This is indeed the
case also in our case once the process has reached the set of allocations W .
Precisely, the following result holds:
Proposition 8. Suppose that νonx , ν
off
x > 0 for all x ∈ X . Then, (W (t), ξ(t)),
restricted to W × {0, 1}X , is a time-reversible Markov process. More precisely,
for every (W, ξ), (W ′, ξ′) ∈ W × {0, 1}X it holds
ρ(W,ξ)Λ(W,ξ),(W ′,ξ′) = ρ(W ′,ξ′)Λ(W ′,ξ′),(W,ξ) (20)
where
ρ(W,ξ) =

 ∏
x: ξx=1
νonx
∏
x: ξx=0
νoffx

 eγΨ(W ) (21)
Proof It follows from relations (16) and the definition of admissible families,
that the only cases when Λ(W,ξ),(W ′,ξ′) and Λ(W ′,ξ′),(W,ξ) are not both equal to
zero are the following:
(i) W ′ =W , ξx¯ = 0, ξ
′
x¯ = 1, ξx = ξ
′
x ∀x 6= x¯
(ii) W ′ =W , ξx¯ = 1, ξ
′
x¯ = 0, ξx = ξ
′
x ∀x 6= x¯
(iii) ξ′ = ξ, W ′ ∈ Nx¯(W, ξ).
In case (i), we have that
ρ(W,ξ)
ρ(W,ξ′)
=
∏
x: ξx=1
νonx
∏
x: ξx=0
νoffx∏
x: ξ′x=1
νonx
∏
x: ξ′x=0
νoffx
=
νoffx¯
νonx¯
=
Λ(W,ξ′),(W,ξ)
Λ(W,ξ),(W,ξ′)
Case (ii) can be analogously verified. Consider now case (iii). Using relations
(10), (16), and (14), we obtain
ρ(W,ξ)
ρ(W ′,ξ)
= eγ(Ψ(W )−Ψ(W
′)) = eγ(Ux¯(W )−Ux¯(W
′))
=
Λ(W ′,ξ),(W,ξ)
Λ(W,ξ),(W ′,ξ)
We now show that under a slight stronger assumption than (1), namely,∑
x∈A
αx <
∑
y∈N(A)
βy ∀A ⊆ X , (22)
the process (W (t), ξ(t)) restricted to W × {0, 1}X is ergodic. Denote by L the
subgraph of Lp restricted to the set W . Notice that, as a consequence of time-
reversibility, L is an undirected graph. Ergodicity is equivalent to proving that
L is connected. We start with a lemma analogous to previous Lemma 5.
Lemma 9. Suppose (G, α, β) satisfies (22) and let W ∈ W. Then, for every
y¯ ∈ X , there exists a sequence (17) satisfying the conditions (Sa), (Sb), and
(Sc) as in Lemma 5.
Proof It is sufficient to follow the steps of to the proof of Lemma 5 noticing
that in (19) the first equality is now a strict inequality, while the last strict
inequality becomes an equality.
If W,W ′ ∈ W are connected through a path in L, we write that W ∼ W ′.
Introduce the following distance on W : if W 1,W 2 ∈ W
δ(W 1,W 2) =
∑
x,y
|W 1xy −W
2
xy|
A pair {W 1,W 2} ∈ W is said to be minimal if
δ(W 1,W 2) ≤ δ(W 1
′
,W 2
′
) ∀W 1
′
∼W 1, ∀W 2
′
∼W 2
Notice that L is connected if and only if for any minimal pair {W 1,W 2}, it
holds W 1 =W 2.
Lemma 10. Let {W 1,W 2} be a minimal pair. Suppose y ∈ X is such that
W 1y < βy. Then, W
1
xy =W
2
xy for all x ∈ X .
Proof Suppose by contradiction that W 1xy < W
2
xy for some x ∈ X . Then,
necessarily, there exists y′ 6= y such that W 1xy′ > W
2
xy′ . Consider then W
1′ =
W 1−exy
′
+exy. Since δ(W 1
′
,W 2) < δ(W 1,W 2), this contradicts the minimality
assumption. Thus W 1xy ≥W
2
xy for all x ∈ X . This yields W
2
y < βy. Exchanging
the role of W 1 and W 2 we obtain the thesis.
Proposition 11. If condition (22) holds true, the graph L is connected.
Proof Let {W 1,W 2} be any minimal pair. We will prove thatW 1 andW 2 are
necessarily identical. Consider any resource y. It follows from Lemma 9 that we
can find a sequence y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt−1, xt−1, yt satisfying the same (Sa),
(Sb), and (Sc) with respect to the state allocation W 1. Among all the possible
sequences, choose one with t minimal for given y. We will prove by induction
on t that W 1xy =W
2
xy for all x ∈ X .
If t = 0, it means that W 1y < βy. It then follows from Lemma 10 that
W 1xy = W
2
xy for all x ∈ X . Suppose now that the claim has been proven for
all minimal pairs {W 1,W 2} and any y ∈ X for which t < t¯ (w.r. to W 1) and
assume that y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt¯−1, xt¯−1, yt¯ satisfies the properties (Sa), (Sb),
and (Sc) with respect to W 1.
Since Wxt¯−1yt¯−1 > 0 and yt¯ ∈ Nxt¯−1(W
1,1), it follows from property (ii) in
the definition of admissible families that W ′1 = W 1 − (ext¯−1yt¯−1 − ext¯−1yt¯) ∈
Mxt¯−1(W
1,1). In other words, W ′1 ∼W 1.
Consider nowW 2 and notice that Lemma 10 yieldsW 2xt¯−1yt¯ =W
1
xt¯−1yt¯
< βyt¯ .
Define
W 2
′
=
{
W 2 ifW 2xt¯−1yt¯−1 = 0
W 2 − ext¯−1yt¯−1 + ext¯−1yt¯ ifW
2
xt¯−1yt¯−1
> 0
Again, by property (ii) in the definition of admissible families, it follows that
W ′2 ∼W 2. Since δ(W 1
′
,W 2
′
) ≤ δ(W 1,W 2), this implies that also {W ′1,W ′2}
is a minimal pair. Notice that y = y0, x0, y1 · · · , yt¯−1 satisfies (Sa), (Sb), and
(Sc) with respect to W 1
′
. Therefore, by the induction hypotheses, it follows
that W 1
′
xy = W
2′
xy for all x ∈ X . Since W
1
xy = W
1′
xy and W
2
xy = W
2′
xy, result
follows immediately.
We can now state our final result.
Corollary 12. Assume that the following conditions hold
1. (G, α, β) satisfies (22).
2. νonx > 0, ν
off
x > 0, and ν
act
x > 0 for every x ∈ X ,
3. Mx¯(W, ξ) is an admissible family.
Then, (W (t), ξ(t)), restricted to W × {0, 1}X , is an ergodic time-reversible
Markov process whose unique invariant probability measure is given by
µγ(ξ,W ) = Z
−1
γ

 ∏
x: ξx=1
νonx
∏
x: ξx=0
νoffx

 eγΨ(W )
where Zγ is the normalizing constant.
Proof Let (W, ξ), (W ′, ξ′) ∈ W×{0, 1}X . It follows from the form of the tran-
sition rates (16) and the fact that νonx > 0 for all x, that the process (W (t), ξ(t)),
starting from (W, ξ), will reach (W,1) in bounded time with positive probabil-
ity. Combining with Proposition 11 and using the fact that νactx > 0 for all x,
it then follows that (W (t), ξ(t)) reaches (W ′,1) in bounded time with positive
probability. Finally, from (W ′,1) again the process reaches (W ′, ξ′) in bounded
time with positive probability. This says that the process is ergodic and it
thus possesses a unique invariant measure whose form can be derived by the
time-reversibility property characterized in Proposition 8.
Remark: It follows from previous result that the process W (t) converges
in law to the probability distribution
µ˜γ(W ) := Z˜
−1
γ e
γΨ(W )
Notice that when γ → +∞, the probability µ˜γ converges to a probability con-
centrated on the set argmaxW∈W Ψ(W ) of state allocations maximizing the po-
tential. Thus, if γ is large, the distribution of the process W (t) for t sufficiently
large will be close to a maximum of Ψ.
Remark: Condition (22) is necessary for ergodicity. Notice indeed that
in the case when G is complete and αx = βx = a for all x ∈ X , under every
allocation W such that Wy = a for every y, all resources will be saturated and,
consequently, no distribution move will be allowed in W . Such allocations W
are thus all sinks in the graph L that is therefore not connected.
5 Simulation
In this section, we present some numerical results to validate the theoretical
approach. We aim to show that the algorithm is feasible for practical imple-
mentation and that it has good performance and scaling properties. Example
presented are admittedly simple: our goal is here is not to work out codes with
optimized performance, neither to present exhaustive sets of simulations.
All our examples are for the case when the functional has the form defined
in (6), but the last one where instead we consider the form (7).
We always take
Call = 3(||α||∞|C
agg|+ ||β||∞C
con) (23)
This choice is motivated by the considerations in (11). We assume that Ccony = 1
for all units and we consider both the case when the aggregation parameter Cagg
is positive or negative.
As a graph, we use either a complete graph or a regular graph of degree 10
randomly constructed according to the classical configuration model.
We assume the admissible familyMx¯(W, ξ) to be of type 3) presented before
where modifications allowed are those where a unit either allocate or move a
number of data constrained in a set Q. Most of the examples are for Q = {1}:
just one data is allocated or moved each time.
On the basis of our theoretical analysis, the algorithm, in the limit when
t → +∞ and the inverse noisy parameter γ → +∞, is known to converge to
the optimum. In practical implementations, a typical choice in these cases is
to take the parameter γ, time-varying and diverging to +∞. The tuning of the
divergence rate is known to be critical to obtain good results. Here we have
chosen the activation rate νact = 1/n and
γ(t+ 1) = γ(t) +
1
100000
Moreover, we suppose the units to be always on (otherwise things get simply
slowed down). The time horizon is fixed T = 5 ∗
∑
x∈X αx: in this way a unit x
will activate, on average, a number of times equal to 5 times the number of data
it needs to allocate. As we will see, this time range is sufficient for the allocation
to be completed and to get close to the optimum (this has been checked in those
cases when the optimum is analytically known).
For all examples, the performance of the algorithm is analyzed considering
the following parameters computed, in a Montecarlo style, by averaging over 10
runs of the algorithm.
• Distance from Full Allocation:
∆ =
∑
x∈X
αx −
∑
x,y∈X
Wxy
counts the quantity of atoms not yet allocated. If the allocation is com-
plete, this parameter is 0.
• Allocation complexity: Denoted by mx the total number of moves
(allocation and distribution) made by unit x, we consider
νmoves =
1
n
∑
x∈X
mx
αx
νmoves measures the number of allocation and distribution moves per piece
of data. Since moving data from a resource to another can be expensive,
it is an interesting parameter to consider
• Distance in ratio from optimum: In cases when the maximum of the
potential Ψopt is explicitly known (Example 2), we consider ψ =
Ψ(WT )
Ψopt
.
• Degree complexity: We consider the average number of resources used
by a unit
d :=
1
n
∑
x∈X
∑
y∈X
1{WTxy>0}
d is a measure of how concentrated or diffused is the allocation. For
matching allocations d = 1.
We now present a number of simulations for the case when the functional
has the form defined in (6). We first consider the case when Q = {1}: just one
data is allocated or moved each time a unit activates. We always take Ccon = 1
and Call chosen according to (23) and different values for Cagg.
Example 5. Consider to have n = 10 users on a complete graph such that
αx = a = 45 and βx = b = 50 for every unit x. We consider the cases:
Cagg = −7,−1, 1/2, 3. First, we show the final states reached by the dynamics
for a single run of the algorithm
W−7 =


0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
6 5 5 0 6 5 6 6 0 6
5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 5
5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 0


W−1 =


0 5 3 5 5 4 8 7 6 2
9 0 3 4 4 1 6 7 6 5
1 3 0 6 5 6 6 3 8 7
6 1 6 0 6 10 7 0 5 4
3 6 7 8 0 6 2 8 0 5
2 8 9 6 4 0 3 7 5 1
8 3 7 5 9 7 0 0 0 6
4 5 4 4 3 4 5 0 8 8
1 9 2 3 8 1 7 8 0 6
8 10 5 3 3 7 3 4 2 0


W1/2 =


0 0 23 7 0 4 0 0 10 1
3 0 12 7 2 7 2 5 0 7
1 4 0 2 15 2 7 1 12 1
15 6 2 0 2 14 0 1 4 1
4 4 0 1 0 4 13 0 3 16
18 0 0 1 3 0 8 2 8 5
2 7 6 12 2 3 0 0 5 8
1 4 1 9 12 1 9 0 4 4
0 17 1 1 4 1 0 16 0 5
2 5 0 1 6 10 2 17 2 0


W3 =


0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0
0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45
0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 0


For the same runs, we plot in Figure 1 the time evolution of the potentials
and we confront it with the optimal potential represented by the red line. For
Cagg = 3 a matching allocation state is reached and it is a maximum of Ψ
in this case. For Cagg = −7 the solution is also very close to the maximum
that is the diffused allocation state. For Cagg = 1/2,−1, the presence of Nash
equilibria that are not maxima of Ψ slows down the dynamics and the algorithm
does not reach the maximum at time T (this particularly evident for the case
Cagg = 1/2). Increasing in this case the time horizon to T = 20 ∗
∑
α, the
final state of the system gets quite close to the maximum as confirmed by the
two plots in Figure 2.
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Figure 1: Time evolution of the Potential
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Figure 2: Evolution of the Potential with T = 20 ∗
∑
x∈X αx
The following table shows the performance parameters in the Montecarlo
simulation for the usual T .
Table 1: Performance parameters for n = 10
Cagg = −7 Cagg = −1 Cagg = 1/2 Cagg = 3
d 9 8.7400 6.6200 1
ψ 1 0.9944 0.9156 1
∆ 0 0 0 0
νmoves 3.1669 4.9389 4.9331 3.2449
From now on we focus on the cases Cagg = −7, 3, Ccon = 1 and Call chosen
according to (23), showing that reasonably good properties are maintained for
larger communities and different topologies.
Example 6. Consider to have n = 50 users on a complete graph and on a
regular graph of degree 10 such that αx = a = 45 and βx = b = 50 for every unit
x. While a matching allocation state is not reached when Cagg = 3, the value
of the average degree shows that the solution is quite concentrated with most of
units allocating in just one resource. Instead, for Cagg = −7 we have reached
an optimum diffused allocation.
Table 2: Performance parameters for n = 50
(a) Cagg = 3
Complete Regular
d 1.2400 1.2280
ψ 0.9794 0.9872
∆ 0 0
νmoves 1.8238 2.4538
(b) Cagg = −7
Complete Regular
d 45 10
ψ 1 1
∆ 0 0
νmoves 1.3746 1.2898
The next example shows how the presence of heterogeneous resources does
not alter much the performance of the algorithm
Example 7. Consider to have n = 50 users on a complete graph and on a
regular graph of degree 10 such that αx = a = 43 for every x. Assume that
half of the units have βx = 40 and half or them instead βx = 50. Notice that,
in this case, for the regular graph topology, there is no a-priori guarantee that
allocation is feasible. Simulations show however that allocation is reached in all
cases.
In the following example we consider larger families of units connected
through a regular graph of degree 10. Numerical results show the good scala-
bility properties of the algorithm.
Table 3: Performance parameters for n = 50, resources with different storage
capabilities
(a) Cagg = 3
Complete Regular
d 2.0040 2.2760
∆ 0 0
νmoves 2.1540 4.1273
(b) Cagg = −7
Complete Regular
d 42.628 10
∆ 0 0
νmoves 1.9754 1.2862
Example 8. Suppose to have n = 100, 200, 300 users on a regular graph of
degree 10 with αx = a = 45 and βx = b = 50. Table 4 shows the performance
parameters.
Table 4: Performance parameters for n = 100, 100, 300
(a) Cagg = −7
n = 100 n = 200 n = 300
d 10 10 10
ψ 1 1 1
∆ 0 0 0
νmoves 1.2535 1.2832 1.2897
(b) Cagg = 3
n = 100 n = 200 n = 300
d 1.3980 1.4040 1.4017
ψ 0.9751 0.9753 0.9748
∆ 0 0 0
νmoves 2.0125 1.6346 1.5114
Next example consider the case when allocations and distributions are al-
lowed with different granularity Q.
Example 9. Consider to have n = 10 users on a complete graph such that αx =
a = 45 and βx = b = 50 for every unit x. We assume that units can allocate
or move each time a quantity of data belonging to either Q1 = {1, 5, 10} or
Q2 = {1, 25, 45}. We also report the case Q0 = {1} for the sake of comparison.
As expected, the possibility to allocate at one time larger sets of data drastically
reduces the number of allocation and distribution moves and speeds up the algo-
rithm. Notice however that in one case, using the set Q2, the algorithm does not
reach the maximum. This phenomenon is probably due to the fact that allocating
Table 5: Performance parameters for n = 10, different granularity
(a) Cagg = −7
Q0 Q1 Q2
d 9 9 3.8500
ψ 1 0.9999 0.8902
∆ 0 0 0
νmoves 3.1669 0.2311 0.1767
(b) Cagg = 3
Q0 Q1 Q2
d 1 1.0100 1.0100
ψ 1 0.9996 0.9999
∆ 0 0 0
νmoves 3.2449 0.1224 0.0229
large set of data at once can lead to allocation states quite far from the optimum
and thus require longer time to converge. This says that the choice of the set Q
is likely to play a crucial role in order to optimize the speed of convergence of
the algorithm.
Finally, the last example is for the objective functional with the alternative
congestion term (7).
Example 10. Consider to have n = 50 users on a complete graph and on
regular graph of degree 10 such that αx = a = 45 and βx = b = 50 for every unit
x. We take Ccon = 1 and Call chosen according to (23) while we take different
values for Cagg . As expected, in this case, varying the aggregation parameter
Cagg, we obtain solutions with a different degree of fragmentation.
Table 6: Performance parameters for n = 50, alternative congestion term
(a) Regular graph
Cagg = 0 Cagg = −1/2 Cagg = −2 Cagg = −5
d 4.7680 8.2849 9.8240 10
∆ 0 0 0 0
νmoves 4.8604 4.4729 4.3748 5
(b) Complete graph
Cagg = −2 Cagg = −10 Cagg = −20 Cagg = −100
d 13.9640 21.6400 23 45
∆ 0 0 0 0
νmoves 4.7415 4.9951 5 1.3547
This is particularly evident in the case of a complete graph. The choice of the
topology and of the functional parameters can be seen, in this case, as alternative
or complementary ways to prescribe the complexity of the allocation in terms of
links used.
6 Conclusions
We have presented and mathematically analyzed a decentralized allocation al-
gorithm, motivated by the recent interest in cooperative cloud storage models.
We have proved convergence and we have shown the practical implementability
of the algorithm. The tuning of its parameters to optimize performance will be
considered elsewhere. In this direction, it will also be useful to investigate the
possibility to use different utility functions in the definition of the algorithm,
following the ideas in [10] and [13]. On the other hand, it would be of interest to
deepen the relation of this model with generalized Nash equilibrium problems
[3, 4] to better understand the level of generality of out approach.
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